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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ESTHER B. KING 
Plaintiff arnd Resvondent, 
vs. 
LA WRENC:F~ M. KING, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
12056 
AP·P·ELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Defendant, appellant, husband, seeks reduction or 
termination of alimony o bliga ti on. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant's motion for reduction or termination of 
alimony obligation ·was den~d. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reYersal of the order denying modi-
fication of Decree. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, respondent, wife, filed a Complaint for 
divorce on September 29, 1965, alleging that the parties 
had no children and that they were married August 8, 
1949, giving them a marriage of 16 years. (Rl-4). 
Pursuant to motion made by plaintiff's attorney, an 
order was entered allowing shortening of time and the 
divorce was entered October 13, 1965. (R6) 
Defendant, appellant, husband, did not appeal the 
original decree. 
The marriage was plaintiff's third, entered into 
,,·hen she was 37 years of age. (R60, P25, L4-5; P48, 
L7-8). 
The sole ground for the divorce in the pleadings, 
(Rl-4), findings, (R12, iT4), and testimony, (R42, P4, 
L20-P5, LIO), was that defendant in the last two to three 
years of marriage failed to associate with plaintiff, caus-
ing her great nervousness and distress. 
The Findings of Fact for the Decree provide, (Rl3, 
iT9), ''Plaintiff is under a doctor's care for a nervous 
condition and is unable at the present time to secure or 
hold employment, and that it is reasonable and proper 
that defendant pay alimony to plaintiff for her support 
and care in the amount of $250.00 per month," (R13, iT9). 
Testimony given as a basis for a decree failed to con-
sider the distribution of property between the parties. 
2 
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For example, plaintiff was awarded the home of the par-
ties on her testimony that she made the original down 
payment of $3,000.00 and was willing to assume the mort-
gage. (R60, P5, L14-P6, Lll). No other figures were 
given to, nor asked by the trial court, at all, such as the 
·rnlue of the parties assets, or the total or monthly outgo, 
on debts defendant was required to pay. The exception 
·was that they were required to split the bonds, but these 
only totaled $50.00. (R17, iT3). 
The decree of divorce split the property as follows, 
such evidence being established at the hearing on defend-
ant's motion to modify the alimony award, heard July 11, 
1969: Plaintiff received the home of the parties situated 
at 2863 South Holbrook Road, Bountiful, Utah. During 
the marriage plaintiff worked intermittently, mainly dur-
ing strikes of defendant who was employed by Kennecott 
Copper. (R60, P34, L25-P35, L5; P66, L6-9). Defendant 
worked steadily except for union ordered strikes. (R60, 
P26, LG-10). Accordingly, other than plaintiff's initial 
investment of $3,000.00, defendant made substantially 
all of the contributions to the home, and provided for 
plaintiff and her child by one of her prior marriages. At 
the time of the divorce defendant valued the home at 
$18,500.00 market value (R60, P32, Ll0-15), with a mort-
gage thereon of $4,500.00. (R60, P31, L26-29). Plaintiff 
testified that the home value then was $17,500.00, (R60, 
P57, Ll8-22), and $5,000.00 was owed. (R60, P57, Lll-
14). Under plaintiff's statement of facts, she received 
an equity of $12,500.00. Under defendant's statement of 
facts, she received an equity of $14,000.00 She also re-
3 
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ceived the household furnishings. These were valued hy 
defendant at $3,500.00, (R61, Def. Ex. 2). This evidence 
was not controverted. Other than the mortgage on the 
home which plaintiff assumed, defendant received the 
obligations of the parties in the sum of $3,617.42. (R61, 
Def. Ex. 2). He also received his personal effects and a 
pickup truck which was subject to a $2,900.00 obligation. 
(R60, P31, Ll6-19). 
To .July 5, 1969, defendant had paid plaintiff $10,-
025.00 as alimony. (R61, Def. Ex. 2; R60, P29, L26-29). 
Barring the nine month Kennecott Strike of 1967, he has 
faithfully made full payment. Since the strike he has 
even paid $15.00 per month to catch up the strike causc>d 
arrearages. (R60, P31, L5-8, L19-20). 
The award of alimony was apparently entered on the 
premise the plaintiff was unemployable due to a nervous 
condition which caused her hospitalization and psychi-
atric treatment. After the hearing, plaintiff was promptly 
released from the hospital. She has held three jobs since, 
quit them all of her own volition, and without difficulty 
with other employees. (R60, P62, Ll9--P63, L4; P67, 
L6-27). She has had back trouble which has been cured 
by a spinal fusion, her doctor reporting her as being. 
"capable of doing everything but the heaviest of lifting." 
(R61, Def. Ex. 1, admitted by joint stipulation of the par-
ties, letter .June 17, 1969, page 2). She testified that she 
was not under medical care for her back, (R60, P48, L9-
16), and that it gives her trouble only when her posture is 
poor. She then gets "splints." (R60, P55, L2-7). She is 
nervous, but this condition long preceded the decree of 
4 
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divorce. She has been under the care of Dr. Diumenti, 
Bom1tiful, Utah, since 1953 or 1954, seeing him every 
three to four months, and receiving nerve medications for 
the greater part of the entire period. (R60, P65, L2-P66, 
L3). As she has held jobs before and after the divorce, 
while seeing Dr. Diumenti and taking nerve pills, and 
never been fired, her basic nervous condition seems not 
disabling. Plaintiff's own witness, Mrs. Cote, testified 
that plaintiff has always been emotonal. (R60, P7 4, L16-
19). Defendant testified that to his observation plaintiff 
had returned to her normal condition, that is her ordinary 
couclition prior to the break up of the marriage and her 
hospitalization. (R60, P33, L5-26; P34, L4-24; P35, LI0-
1:3). Plaintiff's hospitalization and psychiatric treatment 
luffe terminated. (R60, P63, LIS-30). 
Notwithstanding this, in the three and one-half years 
hetween entry of the decree of divorce and the petition 
for modification, and the 15 months between the spinal 
fnsion and the petition for modification, plaintiff had 
only worked a couple of months total at three different 
johs and had made only" several" other job applications. 
(RGO, P50, L19-29). 
Since her back fusion she has done such things as 
~~hovel snow, (R60, P41, L29-P43, LI; P50, L7-8), done 
h0r household chores, (RGO, P62, L12-13), gone on pine 
nut picking trips, (R60, P16, L21-Pl7, L 24; P 61, L18-
2G), and picked fruit from trees, (R60, P16, L13-20). 
The jobs she had since the divorce involved very 
lH'HV,\' manual labor. She \Yas the sole waitress, cook and 
5 
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janitrcss on a restaurant night shift, (R60, P19, L3-14, 
grape picker, (R60, P62, L30-P63, Ll), and shipping clerk 
taking heavy boxes from a conveyor belt, (R60, P59, L18-
P60, L6). She testified that these jobs were too strenu-
ous. The fact she would consider them and do them at all 
must indicate a basic physical soundness. She said that 
she terminated all of these employments due either to 
pneumonia or back trouble, all conditions from which she 
had since recovered. ( R60, P67, L6-26). 
She told a friend that she quit her two mouth job as 
a \vaitress because if defendant found out, he might want 
to reduce the alimony. (R60, P19, L15-P20, L3). During 
the same period defendant remained steadily employed 
at Kennecott Copper where he has worked for 21 years. 
(R60, P26, L5-10). His gross earnings at the time the 
Decree of Divorce was entered were $8,217.68 per year. 
(R60, P26, L12-16). In 1969 they were $8,712.00 per year, 
but his net was decreased from 1965 due to taxes. (R60, 
P27, L3-8, L14-20). His present monthly net income is 
$470.00 to $490.00. (R60, P27, L9-10). Defendant has 
remarried during the interim period to a woman with 
four children who receives only partial support from 
their father. (R60, P37, L3-24). As a matter of human 
necessity he provides in part for these children and his 
present wife. He testified that he has been unable to get 
out of debt due to the alimony requirement, the nine 
month Kennecott strike in 1967, and the increased cost 
of living. (R60, P30, Lll-15, L24, P31, IA). The monthly 
payments on the previous obligations, which he has paid, 
has also kept him indebted, acquiring one debt as he re-
6 
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tires another. (R61, Def. Ex. 2). Without his remarriage, 
he would still be in financial cliff iculty. ( R60, P35, L17-
27). Deducting plaintiff's $250.00 per month alimony and 
the present $15.00 additional clef endant pays on arrear-
ages, leaves defendant a net of $205.00 to $225.00 a month. 
From this he must pay the $3,600.00 in outstanding obli-
gations of the parties ancl their succeeding debts, make 
good the disastrous financial effects of the Kennecott 
strike, and provide in part for his present wife and her 
children. 
Since the divorce, plaintiff has acquired an apart-
ment in the basement of the home. She pays $50.00 a 
month for its building cost and rents it for $70.00 per 
month. (R60, P54, L6-14). She pays $86.00 monthly on 
the first mortgage on the home, and will have it paid off 
in 1972. (R60, P57, Lll-14). By 1972, the costs of build-
ing the basement apartment will also be paid off. The 
rPsult will be that when plaintiff is 60, she will own the 
home clear, and have an income producing apartment. 
It should be noted that defendant's attorney, Samuel 
King, is not related to either party. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
CHANGING FROM ITS ORIGINAL POSI-
TION ON THE PETITION TO REDUCE ALI-
1\[0NY, AND ITS DENIAL OF SUCH PETI-
TION IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE WEIGHT 
ORDINARILY GIVEN TO THE RULINGS 
OF A TRIAL COURT. 
7 
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At the conclusion of the .July 11, 1969, hearing, the 
court called counsel into chambers, and said it would 
give defendant a $50.00 per month alimony reduction, 
and further reductions based on plaintiff's earnings, and 
required her to make good faith efforts to find and hold 
employment. (R76, letter dated .July 21, 1969, and R69). 
Plaintiff's attorney prepared the order. (R69). The 
order was a<lverse to plaintiff's position. Her attorney 
would not have prepared it in that form, unless he clearly 
understood it to be the order of the court. The trial court 
failed to sign the order to otherwise act. After a passage 
of time, defendant's counsel petitioned the court to sign 
the order, (R54-56), but suggested that it be modified. 
Defendant's proposal, to modify the order, was that ill-
stead of reducing alimony based on plaintiff's work rec-
ord that the court find a specific sum as representative 
of plaintiff's potential earnings and use that figure to 
reduce the defendant's obligations. 
At the hearing on defendant's motion to have the 
order signed, preferably with modifications, the trial 
judge changed his position, an<l offered defendant a flat 
$50.00 per month reduction, on risk of having relief de-
nied him altogether. This ·was on September 9, 1969. 
(R69, Pl-3). The relief offered was not adequate so de-
fen<lant refused the court's offer, and asked for the rul-
ing originally announced by the court. The court then 
denied any relief. Plaintiff's counsel agreed, during this 
argument, that the order he originally submitted was the 
order the court first stated, (R67, P2, Ll0-28). The court 
denied this and said it was onl~T a proposal of settlement 
8 
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by the court if the parties agreed to it and was not an 
order at all. (R67, P2, Ll9-22). 
The trial court has been inconsistent in three ways. 
If it originally found, as it eventually ruled, that there 
was no change of circumstances, why did it do the fol-
lowing? First, it put plaintiff in the position of facing a 
flat $50.00 per month alimony reduction, together with 
additional reductions based on her work. If there were 
no change of circumstances, why should the court require 
plaintiff to negotiate her position on alimony? Second, 
the original alimony was based on plaintiff's inability to 
work and the court ultimately found no change of circum-
stances. If this means the court found she was unemploy-
able, why did it propose a stipulation for modification 
based on her earnings and require her to go to work"? 
Third, if there was no change of circumstances, why did 
the court offer defendant at the September 1969 hearing 
a $.50.00 reduction. 
The Findings of Fact were not signed by the court 
until ~larch 20, 1970. Paragraph II of the Findings 
states, "That the plaintiff is suffering with back prob-
lems after a spinal fusion operation on March 31, 1968, 
rendering plaintiff unable to bend or stoop to do things; 
further her back condition has rendered her unable to 
secure employment or hold employment. The plaintiff 
has been seeing Dr. Diumenti and Dr. Hess in connection 
with her physical and nervous condition." (R62-63). 
This is in flat error of fact. Plaintiff's doctor reported 
plaintiff able to be "capable of doing all but the heaviest 
lifting." (R61, Def. Ex. 1, letter .June 17, 1969, page 2). 
9 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiff testified that her back trouble was not disabling, 
that she was no longer under medical care for it, (R60, 
P48, L9-16), and her only major hack complaint is 
"splints" when her posture is poor. (R60, P55, L2-7). 
There is no issue raised as to the integrity of the 
trial court, but its present, final, ruling simply fails to 
relate to its earlier actions. \Vhen the trial court heard 
the evidence, it proposed relief. Six months later, 'vhen 
pressed for a specific ruling, it denied relief. No evidence 
had been introduced in the interim to defendant's knowl-
edge. Under these circumstances, the weight usually 
given to the findings of a trial court should not be given 
here. The appellate court should consider the matter on 
its merits. Hampton v. Ha1nipton, 86 U. 570, 47 P.2cl 419; 
53 Am. J ur., Trials, §1140, pp. 794-795. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENY-
ING DEFENDANT RELIEF ON ALIMONY 
BECAUSE THERE WERE SUBSTANTIAL-
LY CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTI-
FYING SUCH RELIEF. 
30-3-5 UCA, 1953, as amended, gives the court power 
to modify a Decree of Divorce for the support and main-
tenance of the parties as shall be reasonab1e and neces-
sary. 30-3-9, dealing with a guilty party forfeiting all 
rights has been repealed. 
The trial court denied reduction or termination of 
alimo11y to defendant on the ground that lH' fail rel to show 
a change of circumstancrs. The court cnccl. 
10 
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There were two basic changes of circumstances. The 
defendant had been unable to work his way out of debt 
because the wife got everything in the divorce decree and 
he got the debts. (R61, Def. Ex. 2). He would have been 
unable in his opinion to survive adequately financially 
even if he had not remarried. (R60, P35, L17-27). His 
remarriage presented him 'With four stepchildren being 
inadequately provided for by their natural father. (R60, 
P37, L3-24). His net income was reduced since the decree 
although his gross was increased by $600.00. (R60, P26, 
L16-26, P27, L3-20). The remarriage and subsequent 
obligations of an ex-husband are not a primary factor in 
any given case. It is acknowledged that he must provide 
for the first relationship first. However, it is a human 
factor and if it can be recognized without doing great 
harm to the other party, it should be given appropriate 
weight. 
The second and major error of the trial court was in 
finding that the plaintiff's circumstances had not 
changed. They were changed. 
\Vhen the divorce was granted, plaintiff was given 
alimony because she was hospitalized for psychiatric 
r<>asons. Since then she has terminated her hospitaliza-
tion, psychiatric treatment and had her back repaired, 
and was capable of working several jobs, which were 
terminated only by her quitting. In 1969 she was "ca-
pable of doing anything except the heaviest of lifting." 
(R61, Def. Ex. 1, letter June 17, 1969, page 2). 
11 
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If plaintiff chose to obtain employment, the economic 
problems between the parties would be resolved between 
the parties. She testified that her back at the present 
time gave her no trouble except for splints when her pos-
ture was poor. She 1" not im<ler medical care for her 
hack. (R60, P48, L9-16; P55, L2-7). She did not deny 
the letter of her attending physician, Dr. Hess, which 
indicated she could do any work except that involving the 
heaviest lifting. (R61, Ex. 1). She has held jobs both 
before and after the decree of divorce. She has never been 
fired from a job and has gotten along with her co-employ-
ees. (RGO, PG2, L19-P63, L4). She testified that she was 
going to work and reduce alimony, but in view of her 
only maki11g '' sc•\·rral'' efforts to find employment, (R60, 
P30, L19-29), the genuinem•ss of her efforts is obYiously 
i10t great. 
In view of the fact that this marriage was plaintiff's 
third marriage, and she had no children by it, and entered 
into it at the age of 37 and exited from it at the age of 
33, it "·oulcl apprar that her right to alimony was based 
almost entirely on her inability to work or care for her-
self at all due to hospitalization "·hen the diYorce was 
heard. At the time the petition for modification was 
heard, she was capable of working arn1 testified that slH' 
was looking for work, although her efforts ~were so inter-
mit te11t that i11 15 months since the spinal fusion \Yhich 
has cured her health condition, she had only made "sev-
eral" job applications. (R60, P50, L19-29). Plaintiff 
also had a ne>1Tous eondition, hut she, her O\Yll witne~s. 
(RGO, P7±, Ll6-17), and defendant, (RGO, P:13, L3-2G: 
12 
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P34, IA-24, P33, Ll0-13), all testified that she ha<l been 
nervous as a matter of character both before and after 
the decree of divorce, and that this had never cost her 
employment either before or after the divorce. Defendant 
provided for plaintiff throughout their marriage, al-
though she worked, at her choosing, during the marriage. 
(R60, P34, L25-P35, L3; P66, L6-9). The facts and equi-
ties preponderate for defendant. He gave plaintiff the 
entire net estate of the parties at the time of the decree 
of divorce. This included a home equity of $12,000.00 to 
$14,000.00 depending on plaintiff's or defendant's fig-
ures, an uncontroverted, $3,540.00 on personal property 
and her personal effects. From the marriage the defend-
ant took only a 1964 pickup truck which was encumbered, 
along with other obligations, in the sum of $3,617.42, all 
of which defendant has paid. Also since the decree of 
divorce through July 5, 1969, he has paid plaintiff $10,-
025.00 in alimony. (R61, Def. Ex. 2; R60, P29, L26-29). 
In view of the established facts that plaintiff got the 
entire net property of the parties at the time of the di-
vorce, that she was unemployable at the time of divorce, 
(Rl3, f[9), but employable at the time of the petition to 
modify, (R61, Def. Ex. 1), and that defendant had been 
in debt continually since entry of the decree of divorce 
because his net earnings have decreased while his obliga-
tions have increased due to cost of living, debts of the 
first marriage and his remarriage, (R60, P30, Lll-15, 
L24-P31, L4), the question then arises, as the basic ques-
tion in the case, as to whether or not an ability of self-
support acquired by a wife which was not present at the 
13 
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time she obtained a decree of divorce, is grounds for a 
change in the amount of alimony that she is to receive. 
No Utah case tests this point specifically although 
many state the general rule that property allocation and 
alimony must conform to the needs and abilities of the 
parties. 
At common law, the rule favored plaintiff. Alimony 
was a permanent award to the 'vife representing the duty 
of the husband, once married, to ever after provide for 
his wife. 
Now, alimony has had some change of character due 
to the general emancipation and employment of women. 
Some authorities hold to the common law rule, but juris 
by juris the rule is being changed. The change is not ba-
sic, in that equity is still done as best possible. It is 
simply that a divorced woman, who can work, should 
work if the alimony is burdensome to the husband. After 
all, a wife docs have a choice of remedies. If she desires 
the protection and status afforded her by the common 
law, she can apply for separate maintenance. Thereby, 
she keeps her status as a married "'oman and the husband 
retains the obligation of her support. 
The rule is best stated in Lockhart 1'. Lockhart, 259 
P.385, C\Vash. 1927), "In this state, ·where the marital 
relation is disturbed by the fault of the husband, the wife 
has a choice of remedies, she may apply for separate 
maintenance, or she may apply for an absolute divorce. 
In the former instance, it is but just that she should have 
14 
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a separate share of her husband's earnings so long as he 
continues in his objectionable conduct. But there is in 
<>very instance ·what the law always favors, the hope of a 
reconciliation and a resumption of the marital relation. 
But where the wife applies for and obtains an absolute 
divorce, this hope is gone, and there is but little more for 
the court to consider than a just division of the common 
property. It is not the policy of the law, nor is it either 
just or equitable, that a divorced wife be given a perpet-
ual lien upon her divorced husband's future earnings. 
She has chosen to go her own way, abandon all the obli-
gations she assumed by her marital vows, and it is only 
under the most unusual circumstances that she can right-
fully call upon him to continuously contribute to her sup-
port.'' In that case alimony was burdensome on the hus-
band and the wife was making no effort to work although 
able to do so. The trial court granted the husband a 
reduction from $150.00 a month to $100.00 per month. 
The appellate court reduced the alimony in stages for 
one year and then terminated it entirely. 
In the case now before the court, it would be appro-
priate for defendant to pay $100.00 per month to plaintiff 
until.January 1, 1973, and alimony should then terminate 
entirely as at that point plaintiff will have a home clear 
of obligations and an income producing apartment also 
clear of obligations in her basement. She will then be 
only 60 years of age. Should her health collapse, she 
could of course petition the court for an increase in the 
alimony. 
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llampton 11 • Hampton, 86 U. 570, 47 P2d 419, is the 
closest Utah casC'. There an ex-,Yife with a minor child 
was not employed. The defendant husband had r0-mar-
ried and had an additional child. His income was reduced 
from $2,100.00 per ~·ear to $1,500.00 per year. The trial 
court, on the husband's petition for modification, reduced 
his alimony from $60.00 p0r month to $54.00 pN month. 
Tlw Suprem0 Court further reduced it to $45.00 per 
m011th, drawing a line between the absolute needs of the 
wife arnl child and the present needs of the husband. Im-
plicit in the judgment, in view of the reduction, is that the 
wifo was rrquired to help herself and not just take a free 
ri< h•. 
Also in support ar0 Lanborn r. Lanborn, 251 J:>. 943, 
(Cal. 1926), a11d Longs r. Langs, 9 N.\V.2d 705, (S.D. 
194~). llf ark r. Mark, 80 N.\V.2d 621, (J\Iinn. 1957), (hold-
ing sprcifically that later acquired ability of a wife to 
work is a changed circumstance jm;tifying modification), 
and Learitt r. Leavitt, 399 P.2d 33, (Cal. 1965), (also 
holding that ability to work, later acquired, is substantial 
change of circumsta11c0s justifying modification.) 
Another factor the court should consider is that thr 
original decree of divorce, although consented to by the 
husband, was so grossly disproportionate in its distrilm-
tion of assets a11d obligations, that it is proper for the 
court to attempt, within reasonable hounds, to rectify, or 
at lt>ast consider, that disposition in its suhsequent rnl-
i11g::-;. A11derso11 r. A11rlerso11, 104 U. 104, 138 P. 252; Fore-
man r. Forema11, 111 U. 72, 176 P.2<1144; L111ulgrce11 r. 
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Lundgreen, 112 U. 31, 184 P.2d 670, (ability to earn is a 
factor to be co11sidered); TV ooley v. Wooley, 113 U. 391, 
195 P.2d 743. 
Defendant respectfully submits that the ruling of the 
trial judge on his motion for modification was erroneous, 
that it was not supported by the evidence, contrary to 
equity, and imposes an impossible burden upon him, and 
no burden upon plaintiff. Accordingly he requests that 
his alimony be reduced forthwith to $100.00 per month, 
~mch alimony to terminate entirely January 1, 1973. 
Respectfuly submitted, 
SAMUEL KING 
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